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Combating	  Antibiotic	  Resistance	  Through	  The	  Health	  Impact	  Fund	  
	  
Kevin	  Outterson,	  Thomas	  Pogge	  &	  Aidan	  Hollis*	  	  Abstract:	   The	  Health	   Impact	   Fund	   is	   an	   innovative	   financing	  mechanism	   for	   global	  
drug	  discovery	  and	  dissemination,	  separating	  the	  reward	  for	  successful	  R&D	  from	  the	  
market	   price	   of	   the	   drug,	   also	   known	   as	   de-­‐linkage.	   	   Aaron	   Kesselheim	   and	   Kevin	  
Outterson	   have	   recently	   proposed	   a	   prize	   and	   reimbursement-­‐based	   de-­‐linkage	  
mechanism	  to	  reimburse	  companies	  for	  antibiotics	  according	  to	  their	  social	  value,	  but	  
conditioned	   on	   achieving	   conservation	   goals	   to	   limit	   resistance.	   	  This	   paper	   will	  
explore	  whether	  this	  antibiotic	  resistance	  conservation	  proposal	  can	  be	  adapted	  to	  the	  
framework	   of	   the	   Health	   Impact	   Fund.	   	  If	   these	   proposals	   can	   be	   meshed,	   then	  
antibiotics	  might	   be	   an	   interesting	   therapeutic	   class	   for	   a	   test	   of	   the	  Health	   Impact	  
Fund.	  
I. Introduction	  On	   April	   7,	   2011,	   the	  World	   Health	   Organization	   embarked	   on	   a	   yearlong	  campaign	  to	  combat	  antibiotic	  resistance.	   	  The	  project	   is	  driven	  by	  several	  related	  concerns:	   resistance	   is	   rising,	   drug	   companies	   are	   producing	   fewer	   innovative	  antibiotics,	   and	   yet	   antibiotics	   continue	   to	   be	   used	   inappropriately.1	  Resistance	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  *	  From	  Boston	  University	  (KO);	  Yale	  University	  (TP);	  and	  the	  University	  of	  Calgary	  (AH).	  Correspondence	  to	  mko@bu.edu.	  	  Aaron	  Kesselheim,	  Adrian	  Towse	  and	  Wendy	  Gordon	  provided	  helpful	  comments.	  	  Mark	  Nickas	  provided	  research	  assistance.	  1WORLD	  HEALTH	  ORGANIZATION,	  WORLD	  HEALTH	  DAY	  –	  7	  APRIL	  2011,	  (available	  at	  http://www.who.int/world-­‐health-­‐day/2011/en/index.html.);	  A.D.So,	  N.	  Gupta,	  S.K.	  Brahmachari,	  I.	  Chopra,	  C.	  Nathan,	  K.	  Outterson,	  J.P.	  Paccaud,	  D.J.	  Payne,	  R.W.	  Peeling,	  M.	  Spiegelman,	  &	  J.	  Weigelt,	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distorts	   markets	   for	   innovative	   antibiotics	   in	   unusual	   and	   counterintuitive	   ways,	  giving	  major	  stakeholders	  economic	  incentives	  to	  waste	  these	  precious	  resources.2	  	  	  An	   insurance	   reimbursement	   system	   that	   rewards	   companies	   primarily	   for	   unit	  sales	   of	   antibiotics	   undermines	   public	   health	   goals	   such	   as	   the	   rational	   use	   of	  antibiotics.	   	   Conversely,	   rational	   use,	   infection	   control	   and	   anti-­‐bacterial	   vaccine	  programs	  significantly	  reduce	  antibiotic	  sales,	  undermining	  company	  research	  and	  development	   (R&D)	   incentives.3	  	   As	   a	   result,	   a	   prominent	   drug	   industry	   leader	  recently	  stated	  that	  antibiotic	  “incentives	  that	  separate	  the	  financial	  return	  from	  the	  use	  of	  a	  product	  are	  the	  only	  way	  to	  change	  this	  behavior.”4	  	  	  Such	  mechanisms	  are	  called	  “de-­‐linkage”	   in	   that	   they	  separate	   the	  markets	   for	  medicines	   from	  R&D	  cost	  recovery.	  	  In	  de-­‐linkage,	  product	  sales	  revenues	  are	  not	  the	  sole	  source	  of	  R&D	  cost	  recovery	  and	  profits,	  but	  are	  supplemented	  or	  replaced	  by	  other	  mechanisms	  such	  as	  prizes.	  	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Towards	  New	  Business	  Models	  for	  R&D	  for	  Novel	  Antibiotics,	  14	  DRUG	  RESISTANCE	  UPDATES	  88	  (2011)	  [hereinafter	  Towards	  New	  Business	  Models];	  Infectious	  Diseases	  Society	  of	  America,	  Combating	  
Antimicrobial	  Resistance,	  Policy	  Recommendations	  to	  Save	  Lives,	  52	  CLIN.	  INFECT.	  DIS.	  (Supp.	  5)	  S397	  (2011).	  2	  Towards	  New	  Business	  Models,	  supra	  note	  1;	  Kevin	  Outterson,	  The	  Legal	  Ecology	  of	  Resistance:	  The	  
Role	  of	  Antibiotic	  Resistance	  in	  Pharmaceutical	  Innovation,	  31	  CARDOZO	  L.	  REV.	  613,	  628	  (2010)	  [hereinafter,	  Legal	  Ecology];	  Aaron	  S.	  Kesselheim	  &	  Kevin	  Outterson,	  Fighting	  Antibiotic	  Resistance:	  
Marrying	  New	  Financial	  Incentives	  to	  Meeting	  Public	  Health	  Goals,	  29	  HEALTH	  AFFAIRS	  1689	  (2010);	  Ramanan	  Laxminarayan	  &	  Anup	  Malani,	  EXTENDING	  THE	  CURE:	  POLICY	  RESPONSES	  TO	  THE	  GROWING	  THREAT	  OF	  ANTIBIOTIC	  RESISTANCE	  (2007)	  available	  at	  http://www.extendingthecure.org/report;	  Rachel	  Nugent,	  Emma	  Back	  &	  Alexandra	  Beith,	  THE	  RACE	  AGAINST	  DRUG	  RESISTANCE	  (2010),	  available	  at	  http://www.cgdev.org/content/publications/detail/1424207/;	  Elias	  Mossialos,	  Chantal	  M.	  Morel,	  Suzanne	  Edwards,	  Julia	  Berenson,	  Marin	  Gemmill-­‐Toyama	  &	  David	  Brogan,	  POLICIES	  AND	  INCENTIVES	  FOR	  PROMOTING	  INNOVATION	  IN	  ANTIBIOTIC	  RESEARCH	  (2010),	  available	  at	  http://www.euro.who.int/__data/assets/pdf_file/0011/120143/E94241.pdf. 
3 Legal Ecology, supra note 2. 4	  Towards	  New	  Business	  Models,	  supra	  note	  1.	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One	  prominent	  de-­‐linkage	  mechanism	  is	  the	  Health	  Impact	  Fund	  (HIF)	  which	  would	  reward	  companies	   for	   the	  health	   impact	  of	   their	  drugs.5	  The	  HIF	   is	  a	  global	  mechanism,	   which	   is	   especially	   valuable	   in	   the	   field	   of	   antibiotics.	   	   Effective	  antibiotics	  are	  a	  global	  common	  pool,	  a	  potentially	  exhaustible	  resource	  that	  should	  be	  managed	  effectively	  on	  a	  global	  basis.6	  	  	  	   This	   essay	   is	   organized	   as	   follows.	   	   In	   Section	   II,	   we	   describe	   the	   original	  Health	  Impact	  Fund	  proposal	  in	  greater	  detail,	  including	  some	  of	  the	  criticisms	  that	  have	   been	   lodged	   concerning	   generic	   competition.	   	   The	   legal	   and	   biological	  complexities	  of	  resistance	  are	  explored	  in	  Section	  III.	  	  The	  legal	  ecology	  of	  resistance	  strongly	   suggests	   that	   new	   antibiotic	   incentives	   must	   be	   conditioned	   on	  meeting	  long-­‐term	  public	  health	  goals.	   	  Otherwise,	  the	  rush	  to	  produce	  new	  antibiotics	  will	  only	  hasten	  the	  arrival	  of	  resistance.	  	  The	  confluence	  of	  antibiotic	  resistance	  and	  the	  HIF	   is	   the	   subject	   of	   Section	   IV,	   evaluating	   whether	   antibiotics	   might	   be	   an	  appropriate	   test	   of	   the	   HIF	   and	   whether	   the	   HIF	   might	   be	   an	   effective	   global	  coordination	  mechanism	  for	  antibiotics.	  	  We	  conclude	  that	  antibiotics	  as	  a	  class	  may	  be	   an	   appropriate	   first	   application	   of	   the	   HIF,	   but	   that	   the	   problems	   of	   cross-­‐resistance	  will	  probably	  require	  all	  antibiotics	  to	  participate.	   	  Significant	  questions	  and	  limitations	  are	  noted.	  	  	  	   The	   stakes	   are	   huge	   for	   getting	   these	   policies	   right;	   the	   Infectious	   Diseases	  Society	  of	  America	  warns	  that	  the	  alternative	  may	  be	  a	  global	  ecological	  collapse	  in	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  5	  Aidan	  Hollis	  &	  Thomas	  Pogge,	  THE	  HEALTH	  IMPACT	  FUND:	  MAKING	  NEW	  MEDICINES	  ACCESSIBLE	  FOR	  ALL	  (Incentives	  for	  Global	  Health,	  2008)	  available	  at	  http://www.yale.edu/macmillan/igh/hif_book.pdf.	  	  See	  www.healthimpactfund.org	  for	  many	  publications	  and	  media	  discussions	  about	  the	  HIF	  as	  well	  as	  information	  about	  HIF	  supporters	  and	  their	  work.	  6	  Laxminarayan	  &	  Malani,	  supra	  note	  2;	  Nugent,	  Back	  &	  Beith,	  supra	  note	  2;	  Mossialos,	  et	  al.,	  supra	  note	  2. 
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antibiotic	  effectiveness.7	   	  
II. The	  Health	  Impact	  Fund	  
A.	  	  Paying	  for	  Global	  Health	  Impact	  	  Financed	  primarily	   by	   governments,	   the	  Health	   Impact	   Fund	   is	   a	   proposed	  pay-­‐for-­‐performance	   mechanism	   that	   would	   offer	   innovators	   the	   option	   —	  completely	   voluntary8	  —	   to	   register	   any	   new	  medicine.9	  By	   registering	   a	   product,	  the	  innovator	  would	  undertake	  to	  make	  it	  available,	  during	  its	  first	  10	  years	  on	  the	  market,	  wherever	  it	  is	  needed	  at	  no	  more	  than	  the	  lowest	  feasible	  cost	  of	  production	  and	  distribution.	  The	  innovator	  would	  further	  commit	  to	  allow,	  at	  no	  charge,	  generic	  production	  and	  distribution	  of	  the	  product	  after	  these	  ten	  years	  have	  ended	  (if	  the	  innovator	   still	   has	   unexpired	   patents	   on	   the	   product).	   In	   exchange,	   the	   registrant	  would	   receive,	   during	   that	   10-­‐year	  period,	   annual	   reward	  payments	  based	  on	   the	  product’s	  health	  impact.	  The	  reward	  payments	  would	  be	  part	  of	  a	  large	  annual	  pay-­‐out,	   with	   each	   registered	   product	   receiving	   a	   cash	   payment	   from	   the	   HIF	  proportional	  to	  its	  share	  of	  the	  assessed	  health	  impact	  of	  all	  HIF-­‐registered	  products	  in	   the	   relevant	   year.10	  If	   the	  HIF	  were	   found	   to	  work	  well,	   its	   annual	   reward	  pool	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  7Infectious	  Diseases	  Society	  of	  America,	  supra	  note	  1;	  Infectious	  Diseases	  Society	  of	  America,	  BAD	  BUGS,	  NO	  DRUGS:	  AS	  ANTIBIOTIC	  DISCOVERY	  STAGNATES...A	  PUBLIC	  HEALTH	  CRISIS	  BREWS	  (2004),	  available	  at	  http://www.idsociety.org/uploadedFiles/IDSA/Policy_and_Advocacy/Current_Topics_and_Issues/Advancing_Product_Research_and_Development/Bad_Bugs_No_Drugs/Statements/As%20Antibiotic%20Discovery%20Stagnates%20A%20Public%20Health%20Crisis%20Brews.pdf#search=%22BAD	  BUGS	  NO	  DRUGS%22 [hereinafter, BAD	  BUGS,	  NO	  DRUGS].	  
8 As noted below, the problem of cross-resistance might require antibiotics to join the HIF in an all-or-
nothing system. 9	  Under	  certain	  conditions,	  the	  HIF	  might	  also	  permit	  a	  company	  to	  register	  a	  traditional	  medicine	  or	  a	  new	  use	  of	  an	  existing	  medicine. 
10 In some cases, the HIF may want to create contractual minimum and maximum payout amounts to 
reduce uncertainty for registrants.  
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could	  be	  scaled	  up	  to	  attract	  an	  increasing	  share	  of	  new	  medicines.11	  	  
The	   HIF	   would	   foster	   the	   development	   of	   new	   high-­‐impact	   medicines	   —	  including	   against	   diseases	   concentrated	   among	   the	   poor	   that	   are	   now	   neglected	  because	   innovators	   cannot	   recover	   their	   R&D	   costs	   from	   sales	   to	   the	   poor.12	  The	  option	  of	  an	  alternative	  reward	  based	  on	  health	  impact	  would	  transform	  heretofore-­‐neglected	   diseases	   into	   some	   of	   the	   most	   lucrative	   pharmaceutical	   R&D	  opportunities.	   	   For	   example,	   many	   have	   suggested	   that	   antibiotic	   research	   isn’t	  financially	  rewarding	  for	  large	  pharmaceutical	  companies.13	  	  	  	  The	  HIF	  would	  help	  to	  reverse	   that	   problem	   by	   offering	   an	   alternative	   revenue	   stream	   of	   up	   to	   several	  billion	  dollars	  per	  drug	  over	  the	  ten-­‐year	  registration	  period.	  	  	  	  
The	  HIF	  would	  also	  promote	  appropriate	   financial	  access	   to	  new	  medicines	  by	  contractually	   limiting	   the	  price	  of	  any	  registered	  product	   to	   the	   lowest	   feasible	  cost	  of	  production	  and	  distribution.	   In	  addition,	   since	   the	  HIF	  only	  pays	   for	  actual	  health	   impact,	   the	  companies	   themselves	  are	  economically	  motivated	   to	  maximize	  access.	   	   The	   HIF	   rewards	   drug	   company	   registrants	   when	   their	   products	   are	  appropriately	  available	   to	   the	  neediest	  patients,	  perhaps	  at	  prices	  below	  marginal	  cost,	   and	   that	   they	   are	   competently	   prescribed	   and	   optimally	   used.	   Registrants	  would	   be	   rewarded	   not	   for	   selling	   their	   products,	   but	   for	   making	   them	   effective	  toward	   improving	   global	   health.	   For	   antibiotics,	   health	   impact	  will	   be	  maximized	  not	   necessarily	   through	   aggressive	   sales,	   but	   also	   through	   careful	   long-­‐term	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  11	  Hollis	  &	  Pogge,	  supra	  note	  5.	  
12 The HIF is limited to new medicines, and perhaps new uses for existing molecules.  It does not directly 
change incentives for existing generic drugs, but if HIF-registered drugs are fully deployed, they may 
effectively compete with generic drugs at lower prices. 13	  Towards	  New	  Business	  Models,	  supra	  note	  2.	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stewardship	   and	   appropriate	   use.	   	   HIF	   incentives	   would	   need	   calibration	   to	   the	  unique	  characteristics	  of	  antibiotics.	  
If	  some	  pharmaceutical	  R&D	  were	  financed	  through	  tax-­‐funded	  HIF	  rewards,	  most	   of	   the	   cost	   would	   be	   borne	   by	   affluent	   populations	   and	   people	  —	   just	   like	  today.	  	  But	  there	  are	  important	  differences.	  	  First,	  innovators	  would	  make	  no	  profit	  from	   the	   sale	   of	   their	  medicine	   as	   such	  —	   they	  would	   profit	   only	   insofar	   as	   this	  medicine	  is	  actually	  used	  to	  improve	  patient	  health.	  Second,	  in	  order	  to	  profit	  from	  serving	   affluent	   patients,	   innovators	  would	   not	   need	   to	   exclude	   poor	   patients.	   On	  the	  contrary,	  they	  would	  profit	  equally	  from	  serving	  poor	  patients,	   too,	  even	  if	   the	  drugs	  were	  offered	  at	  very	  low	  prices.	  Health	  gains	  achieved	  for	  any	  patients	  —	  rich	  or	  poor	  —	  would	  contribute	  equally	  toward	  the	  innovator’s	  bottom	  line.	  
The	   HIF	   will	   provide	   optimal	   incentives	   only	   if	   potential	   registrants	   are	  assured	   that	   the	   rewards	   will	   actually	   be	   there	   in	   the	   decade	   following	   market	  approval.	   Core	   funding	   of	   the	   HIF	   is	   therefore	   best	   guaranteed	   by	   a	   broad	  partnership	   of	   countries.	   If	   governments	   representing	   one	   third	   of	   global	   income	  agreed	   to	   contribute	   just	   0.03	  percent	   of	   their	   gross	  national	   incomes	   (3	  of	   every	  10,000	  currency	  units),	   the	  HIF	  could	  get	  started	  with	  USD	  6	  billion	  annually.	  This	  fixed	  pool	  of	  funds	  will	  be	  divided	  annually	  among	  registrants	  in	  proportion	  to	  the	  health	   impact	   of	   the	   registered	   drug.	   	   Thus,	   the	   HIF	   can	   be	   seen	   as	   an	   ongoing	  competition	  among	  innovators	  that	  ranges	  over	  all	  countries	  and	  all	  diseases,	  with	  firms	  earning	  more	  money	  if	  their	  product	  has	  a	  larger	  impact	  on	  health.	  	  
Health	   impact	   can	  be	  measured	   in	   terms	  of	   the	  number	  of	  quality-­‐adjusted	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life	  years	  (QALYs)14	  saved	  worldwide.	  The	  QALY	  metric	  is	  already	  extensively	  used	  by	  private	  and	  state	  insurers	  in	  determining	  prices	  for	  new	  drugs,	  so	  employing	  it	  in	  calculating	  HIF	  rewards	  is	  not	  a	  big	  leap.	  Taking	  as	  a	  benchmark	  the	  pharmaceutical	  arsenal	   before	   a	   registered	   medicine	   was	   introduced,	   the	   HIF	   would	   estimate	   to	  what	  extent	  this	  medicine	  has	  added	  to	  the	  length	  and	  quality	  of	  human	  lives.	  This	  estimate	   would	   be	   based	   on	   surveillance	   data,	   clinical	   trials,	   including	   pragmatic	  trials	   in	   real-­‐life	   settings,	   combined	   with	   data	   on	   sales	   volumes	   and	   the	  demographic	   and	   clinical	   characteristics	   of	   patients	   using	   the	   product.	   Additional	  tools	  that	  could	  be	  used	  include	  tracking	  randomly	  selected	  medicines	  (identifiable	  by	   serial	   numbers)	   to	   their	   end	   users,	   and	   statistical	   analysis	   of	   sales	   data	   as	  correlated	   with	   data	   about	   the	   global	   burden	   of	   disease.	   These	   estimates	   would	  necessarily	  be	  imperfect.	  But	  so	  long	  as	  any	  errors	  are	  random	  and	  small,	  or	  at	  least	  not	   exploitable	   by	   registrants,15	  HIF	   incentives	  would	   be	  would	   remain	   correct	   in	  their	  direction	  and	  relative	  sizes.	  
The	  reward	  rate,	  in	  terms	  of	  dollars	  per	  QALY,	  would	  be	  calculated	  annually	  for	  each	   registered	  drug	   in	   the	  HIF.	   	  This	   rate	  would	  vary,	  depending	  on	   the	   total	  number	  of	  QALYs	  in	  the	  HIF	  for	  a	  given	  year.	  	  With	  the	  HIF	  so	  designed,	  innovators	  would	  choose	  to	  register	  products	  that	  can	  reduce	  the	  global	  burden	  of	  disease	  most	  cost-­‐effectively.	   Products	   with	   the	   largest	   health	   impact	   would	   make	   the	   most	  money	  —	  creating	  exactly	  the	  right	  incentives	  for	  innovation.	  And	  because	  the	  HIF	  would	  be	  an	  optional	  system,	  the	  reward	  rate	  is	  self-­‐adjusting.	  If	  rewards	  were	  too	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14 For additional details on using QALYs to measure health impact, see Hollis & Pogge, supra note 5. 
15 Since registrants are competing for shares of a fixed pool, public monitoring will be supplemented by the 
private monitoring efforts of other firms in the HIF. 
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high,	  new	  registrants	  would	  enter	  and	  reduce	   the	  annual	   reward	  rate	   (money	  per	  QALY).	   If	   profits	  were	   too	   low,	   the	   reward	   rate	  would	   naturally	   increase	   as	   firms	  would	  choose,	  for	  more	  of	  their	  new	  products,	  to	  forego	  HIF	  registration	  in	  favor	  of	  exploiting	  the	  ordinary	  patent-­‐based	  marketing	  system.	  Competition	  would	  ensure	  that	  registered	  products	  are	  rewarded	  at	  a	  rate	  that	  is	  profitable	  for	  innovators	  and	  maximizes	  the	  effect	  of	  the	  HIF.	  	  
To	   be	   certain	   that	   the	   HIF	   is	   cost-­‐effective	   relative	   to	   other	   public	   health	  expenditures,	  one	  can	  stipulate	  a	  maximum	  reward	  rate;	  if	  one	  year’s	  funds	  are	  not	  fully	  used,	  the	  remainder	  can	  be	  rolled	  over	  into	  future	  years.	  To	  reassure	  potential	  innovators,	  one	  can	  also	  add	  some	  protection	  against	  unreasonably	  low	  rewards.16	  	  	  
B.	  	  Advantages	  of	  the	  Health	  Impact	  Fund	  Let	  us	   sketch	  how	   the	  original	  HIF	  proposal	  would,	  without	   revision	  of	   the	  TRIPS	  Agreement,17	  provide	  systemic	  relief	  for	  seven	  failings	  of	  the	  present	  system.	  	  
High	   Prices	   would	   not	   exist	   for	   HIF-­‐registered	  medicines.	   In	   local	   markets	  where	   buyers	   were	   particularly	   price	   sensitive,	   innovators	   would	   have	   strong	  incentives	  to	  reduce	  prices,	  possibly	  even	  below	  the	  cost	  of	  production,	  in	  order	  to	  increase	  health	  impact	  rewards	  through	  increased	  volume.	  	  
Diseases	   Concentrated	   among	   the	   Poor,	   insofar	   as	   they	   contribute	  substantially	  to	  the	  global	  disease	  burden,	  would	  no	  longer	  be	  neglected.	  In	  fact,	  the	  more	   destructive	   among	   them	   would	   come	   to	   afford	   some	   of	   the	   most	   lucrative	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  16	  Hollis	  &	  Pogge,	  supra	  note	  5.	  	  
17 The TRIPS Agreement sets global minimum standards for intellectual property law. 
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research	   opportunities	   for	   biotechnology	   and	   pharmaceutical	   companies.	   The	  HIF	  counts	  health	  benefits	  to	  the	  poorest	  of	  patients	  equally	  with	  health	  benefits	  to	  the	  richest.	  
Bias	   toward	   Maintenance	   Drugs18 	  would	   be	   absent	   from	   HIF-­‐encouraged	  research.	  The	  HIF	  assesses	  each	  registered	  medicine’s	  health	  impact	  in	  terms	  of	  how	  its	   use	   reduces	  mortality	   and	  morbidity	   worldwide—without	   regard	   to	   whether	   it	  achieves	   this	   reduction	   through	   cure,	   chronic	   treatment,	   or	   prevention.	   This	  would	  guide	   firms	   to	   deliberate	   about	   potential	   research	   projects	   in	   a	   way	   that	   is	   also	  optimal	  for	  global	  public	  health,	  namely	  in	  terms	  of	  the	  expected	  global	  health	  impact	  of	  the	  new	  medicine	  relative	  to	  the	  cost	  of	  developing	  it.	  The	  profitability	  of	  research	  projects	  would	  be	  aligned	  with	  their	  value	  in	  terms	  of	  global	  public	  health.	  
Wastefulness	  would	  be	  dramatically	  lower	  for	  HIF-­‐registered	  products.	  There	  would	  be	  no	  deadweight	   losses	   from	   large	  mark-­‐ups.19	  There	  would	  be	   less	   costly	  patent	   litigation	   as	   generic	   competitors	   would	   lack	   incentives	   to	   invalidate	   weak	  patents	  and	  innovators	  would	  have	  less	  incentive	  to	  suppress	  generic	  products	  (as	  these	   would	   enhance	   the	   innovator’s	   health	   impact	   reward).	   Innovators	   might	  therefore	   often	   not	   even	   bother	   to	   obtain,	   police,	   and	   defend	   patents	   in	   many	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
18 Drugs for long-term chronic conditions may be sold to the same patients for many years, which provides 
a longer and more stable market.  By contrast, an antibiotic is generally given only for a short course and a 
vaccine is generally delivered in a single dose.  Drug company executives complain that the market is 
therefore biased in favor of maintenance drugs.  See, e.g., Steven	  J.	  Projan,	  Why	  is	  Big	  Pharma	  Getting	  
Out	  of	  Antibacterial	  Drug	  Discovery?,	  6	  CURRENT	  OPINION	  IN	  MICROBIOLOGY	  427	  (2003).	   
19 Sean Flynn, Aidan Hollis, and Michael Palmedo, An Economic Justification for Open Access to Essential 
Medicine Patents in Developing Countries, 37 Journal of Law, Medicine & Ethics 184 (2009).  
v.12	  –	  DRAFT	   	   10/31/11	  
	   10	  
national	   jurisdictions.	   To	   register	   a	  medicine	  with	   the	  HIF,	   innovators	   need	   show	  only	  once	  that	  they	  have	  an	  effective	  and	  innovative	  product.20	  	  
Excessive	   Marketing	   would	   also	   be	   much	   reduced	   for	   HIF-­‐registered	  medicines.	  Because	  each	  innovator	  is	  rewarded	  for	  the	  health	  impact	  of	  its	  addition	  to	   the	   medical	   arsenal,	   incentives	   to	   develop	   me-­‐too	   drugs	   to	   compete	   with	   an	  existing	   HIF-­‐registered	   medicine	   would	   be	   weak.	   And	   innovators	   would	   have	  incentives	  to	  urge	  a	  HIF-­‐registered	  drug	  upon	  doctors	  and	  patients	  only	   insofar	  as	  such	  marketing	  results	  in	  measurable	  therapeutic	  benefits	  for	  which	  the	  innovator	  would	  then	  be	  rewarded.	  	  In	  antibiotics,	  this	  feature	  will	  be	  especially	  welcome,	  as	  it	  removes	  financial	  pressures	  to	  promote	  resistance	  through	  excessive	  sales.	  
Counterfeiting	  of	  HIF-­‐registered	  products	  would	  be	   less	  attractive.	  With	   the	  genuine	  item	  widely	  available	  near	  or	  even	  below	  the	  marginal	  cost	  of	  production,	  there	  is	  less	  to	  be	  gained	  from	  producing	  and	  selling	  counterfeits.21	  
The	   Last-­‐Mile	   Problem	   would	   be	   mitigated	   because	   each	   HIF-­‐registered	  innovator	  would	  have	  strong	  incentives	  to	  ensure	  that	  patients	  are	  fully	  instructed	  and	  properly	  provisioned	  so	  that	  they	  make	  optimal	  use	  (dosage,	  compliance,	  etc.)	  of	  its	  medicines,	  which	  will	  then,	  through	  wide	  and	  effective	  deployment,	  have	  their	  optimal	   public	   health	   impact.	   Rather	   than	   ignore	   poor	   countries	   as	   unprofitable	  markets,	  pharmaceutical	  companies	  would,	  moreover,	  have	  incentives	  to	  work	  with	  one	   another	   and	  with	   national	   health	  ministries,	   international	   agencies	   and	  NGOs	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  20Talha	  Syed,	  SHOULD	  A	  PRIZE	  SYSTEM	  FOR	  PHARMACEUTICALS	  REQUIRE	  PATENT	  PROTECTION	  FOR	  ELIGIBILITY?	  (Incentives	  for	  Global	  Health,	  Discussion	  Paper	  No.	  2,	  2009).	  
21 Kevin Outterson & Ryan Smith, Counterfeit Drugs: The Good, The Bad, and the Ugly, 16 Albany L. J. 
of Science & Technology 525 (2006). 
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toward	   improving	   the	   health	   systems	   of	   these	   countries	   in	   order	   to	   enhance	   the	  impact	  of	  their	  HIF-­‐registered	  medicines	  there.	  
	  
C.	  	  Critiques	  of	  the	  Health	  Impact	  Fund	  	  
James	   Love	   of	   Knowledge	   Ecology	   International	   has	   criticized	   the	  HIF	   in	   a	  number	   of	   forums.22	  	   Love	   has	   proposed	   several	   global	   de-­‐linkage	  mechanisms	   to	  pay	   for	   R&D	   outside	   of	   the	   market	   reimbursement	   system. 23 	  	   	   His	   primary	  substantive	   criticism	   is	   that	   the	   HIF	   leaves	   patents	   in	   the	   hands	   of	   the	   patent	  owners,	   thereby	   delaying	   market-­‐based	   generic	   competition	   from	   multiple	  producers.	  	  Others	  share	  this	  concern	  in	  the	  broader	  context	  of	  prize	  proposals	  that	  rely	   on	   contractual	   access	   provisions.24	  	   In	   response	   to	   these	   criticisms,	   the	   HIF	  proposal	  was	   adjusted	   to	   permit:	   (a)	   sub-­‐contracting	   (licensing)	   to	   generic	   firms;	  (b)	  tender	  systems;	  and	  (c)	  administratively	  determined	  prices.25	  The	  final	  form	  of	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  22See	  James	  Love,	  THE	  HEALTH	  IMPACT	  FUND	  PROPOSAL,	  (Knowledge	  Ecology	  International,	  2008),	  
available	  at	  http://keionline.org/hif.	  	  For	  a	  recent	  response	  from	  the	  HIF	  project,	  see	  Thomas	  Pogge	  &	  Jake	  Hirsch-­‐Allen,	  A	  Response	  From	  the	  Authors	  of	  the	  Health	  Impact	  Fund,	  Intellectual	  Property	  Watch,	  Oct.	  3,	  2011,	  available	  at	  http://www.ip-­‐watch.org/weblog/2011/10/03/a-­‐response-­‐from-­‐the-­‐authors-­‐of-­‐the-­‐health-­‐impact-­‐fund/.	  	  	  23James	  Love,	  Prizes,	  Not	  Prices,	  to	  Stimulate	  Antibiotic	  R&D,	  SCI.	  &	  DEVELOP.	  NETWORK,	  Mar.	  26,	  2008,	  available	  at	  http://www.scidev.net/en/opinions/prizes-­‐not-­‐prices-­‐to-­‐stimulate-­‐antibiotic-­‐r-­‐d-­‐.html;	  James	  Love	  &	  Tim	  Hubbard,	  The	  Big	  Idea:	  Prizes	  to	  Stimulate	  R&D	  for	  New	  Medicines,	  82	  CHI.-­‐KENT	  L.	  REV.	  1519	  (2007);	  James	  Love	  &	  Tim	  Hubbard,	  Prizes	  for	  Innovation	  of	  New	  Medicines	  and	  Vaccines,	  18	  ANNALS	  HEALTH	  L.	  155,	  159-­‐60	  (2009). 24Paul	  Wilson	  &	  Amrita	  Palriwala,	  PRIZES	  FOR	  GLOBAL	  HEALTH	  TECHNOLOGIES:	  AN	  ASSESSMENT	  WITH	  A	  CASE	  STUDY	  IN	  TB	  DIAGNOSTICS	  (2010),	  available	  at	  http://healthresearchpolicy.org/sites/healthresearchpolicy.org/files/assessments/files/R4D%20Prizes%20Assessment%20Draft%20Report_2.pdf;	  Donald	  W.	  Light,	  Making	  Practical	  Markets	  for	  
Vaccines,	  2	  PLOS	  MED.	  934	  (2005);	  Donald	  W.	  Light,	  Is	  G8	  Putting	  Profits	  Before	  the	  World’s	  Poorest	  
Children?,	  370	  LANCET	  297	  (2007);	  Donald	  W.	  Light,	  GAVI’s	  Advance	  Market	  Commitment,	  375	  LANCET	  638	  (2010).	  25	  Aidan	  Hollis,	  THE	  HEALTH	  IMPACT	  FUND	  AND	  PRICE	  DETERMINATION	  (Incentives	  for	  Global	  Health	  Discussion	  Paper	  #1,	  2009)	  available	  at	  http://www.yale.edu/macmillan/igh/files/papers/DP1_Hollis.pdf). 
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the	  HIF	  has	  yet	   to	  be	  determined	  and	   it	   is	   likely	   that	  a	  variety	  of	   contract	  options	  may	   prove	   most	   attractive	   for	   different	   classes	   of	   medicines.	   	   With	   respect	   to	  antibiotics,	  because	  of	   the	   interest	   in	  conservation,	   there	   is	  a	  stronger	  rationale	   to	  prefer	  to	  limit	  the	  rights	  to	  produce	  and	  sell	  the	  drug,	  as	  we	  explore	  below.	  	  	  	  Other	   practical	   concerns	   include	   measuring	   health	   impact	   in	   order	   to	  determine	  the	  prize	  payments	  and	  obtaining	  sufficient	  financial	  support	  to	  fund	  the	  HIF.	   	  Measurement	  will	   be	   a	   complex	   task,	  with	  many	   real-­‐world	   epidemiological	  problems	   to	   solve,	   including	   tracking	   and	  disentangling	   the	   various	   causal	   factors	  implicated	  in	  health	  impact.	  	  Substantial	  work	  is	  underway	  to	  articulate	  appropriate	  metrics,	  but	  will	  not	  be	  detailed	  here,	  as	  it	  was	  the	  subject	  of	  a	  two-­‐day	  conference	  at	   Harvard	   in	   November	   2009	   and	   ongoing	   work	   thereafter.	   In	   addition	   to	  measuring	   the	  health	   impact	   from	  antibiotics	   in	  a	  specific	  year,	  additional	  work	   is	  needed	  to	  consider	  the	  future	  health	  impact	  of	  inappropriate	  antibiotic	  use	  today.	  	  The	   funding	  question	  will	   be	  dependent	  upon	   the	  political	  will	   to	   initiate	   a	  realistic	   test	   of	   the	  HIF.	   	   This	   essay	  outlines	   a	   therapeutic	   category	  of	   drugs	   for	   a	  potential	  large-­‐scale	  test,	  namely	  systemic	  antibacterials.	  
III. The	   Legal	   Ecology	   of	   Antibiotic	   Resistance	   and	   the	   Need	   for	   Global	  
Coordination	  Before	   turning	   to	   the	   potential	   case	   of	   an	   antibiotic	   HIF	   (aHIF),	   we	   must	  briefly	  explore	  some	  of	  the	  unique	  legal	  and	  biological	  aspects	  of	  antibiotics.	  These	  unique	  characteristics	  make	  antibiotics	  an	  appealing	  candidate	  for	  a	  test	  of	  the	  HIF,	  but	  also	  suggest	  some	  aHIF	  modifications	  to	  account	  for	  the	  problem	  of	  resistance.	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Antibiotics	   may	   be	   the	   greatest	   single	   medical	   success	   of	   the	   twentieth	  century.	   	   If	   antibiotics	   were	   to	   lose	   their	   effectiveness,	   some	   of	   the	   advances	   in	  health	   over	   the	   previous	   seventy-­‐five	   years	   would	   be	   threatened.	   	   The	   edifice	   of	  modern	  medicine	   rests	   upon	   the	   foundation	   of	   effective	   antibiotic	   therapies.	   	   But	  this	   achievement	   rests	   on	   an	   insecure	   foundation.	   	   As	   antibiotics	   are	   used,	   they	  create	   evolutionary	   pressure	   that	   threatens	   their	   undoing	   through	   resistance.26	  	  	  Resistance	  is	  an	  evolutionary	  dynamic.	  	  	   Antibiotic	   effectiveness	   can	   also	   be	   understood	   as	   an	   ecological	   issue,	   a	  valuable	   common	   pool	   resource	   akin	   to	   productive	   fisheries.	   	   Common	   pools	   are	  prone	   to	  depletion	   and	   collapse	   through	  uncoordinated	  withdrawals,	  which	   is	   the	  history	  of	  the	  destruction	  of	  the	  vast	  herds	  of	  American	  buffalo	  in	  the	  Great	  Plains	  in	  the	   19th	   Century.27	  	   In	   the	   case	   of	   antibiotics,	   withdrawals	   occur	   as	   antibiotic	  resistance	   grows	   through	   use	   and	   misuse,	   including	   antibiotic	   pollution	   when	  resistance	  externalities	  are	  spread	  across	  populations	  and	  drugs.	  	  The	  common	  pool	  is	  renewed	  through	  conservation	  and	  the	  addition	  of	  new	  antibiotic	  therapies.	   	  We	  face	  a	  tragedy	  of	  the	  antibiotic	  commons	  as	  uncoordinated	  use,	  misuse	  and	  pollution	  of	   precious	   antibiotics	   may	   prematurely	   destroy	   these	   important	   drugs. 28	  	  	  Incentives	   for	   new	   antibiotics	   must	   therefore	   be	   conditioned	   on	   addressing	   both	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  26	  BAD	  BUGS,	  NO	  DRUGS,	  supra note 7;	  Infectious	  Diseases	  Society	  of	  America,	  supra	  note	  1;	  Mossialos	  et	  al.,	  supra	  note	  2;	  Nugent,	  Back	  &	  Beith,	  supra	  note	  2;	  Laxminarayan	  &	  Malani,	  supra	  note	  2.	  	  27	  M.	  Scott	  Taylor,	  Buffalo	  Hunt:	  International	  Trade	  and	  the	  Virtual	  Extinction	  of	  the	  North	  American	  
Bison,	  AMER.	  ECON.	  REV.	  (forthcoming	  2011). 
28Timo	  Goeschl	  &	  Timothy	  Swanson,	  The	  Interaction	  of	  Dynamic	  Problems	  and	  Dynamic	  Policies:	  Some	  
Economics	  of	  Biotechnology,	  in	  BATTLING RESISTANCE TO ANTIBIOTICS AND PESTICIDES: AN ECONOMIC 
APPROACH (Ramanan Laxminarayan ed., 2003); Kevin	  Outterson,	  The	  Vanishing	  Public	  Domain:	  
Antibiotic	  Resistance,	  Pharmaceutical	  Innovation	  and	  Intellectual	  Property	  Law,	  67	  U.	  PITT.	  L.	  REV.	  67,	  122	  (2005)	  [hereinafter,	  Vanishing	  Public	  Domain]. 
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ecological	   and	   evolutionary	   (Eco/Evo)	   factors,29	  to	   ensure	   that	   long-­‐term	   public	  health	  goals	  are	  achieved.30	  	  	  	   Resistance	  creates	  at	  least	  six	  important	  policy	  issues	  for	  antibiotic	  incentives,	  as	  described	  in	  the	  chart	  below	  and	  the	  text	  that	  follows:	  	  
Policy	  Issue	   Implications	  1.	  	  Conservation	  dampens	  R&D	  incentives	  for	  new	  antibiotics	   Optimal	  solutions	  must	  balance	  conservation	  and	  new	  production;	  faster	  introduction	  of	  new	  molecules	  may	  harm	  global	  public	  health	  2.	  	  Companies	  have	  financial	  incentives	  to	  maximize	  unit	  sales	  of	  antibiotics,	  wasting	  antibiotics	  through	  resistance	  
De-­‐linkage	  enables	  companies	  to	  profit	  from	  meeting	  public	  health	  goals	  
3.	  	  Resistance	  stimulates	  innovation	  by	  clearing	  the	  field	  of	  competitive	  antibiotics	   New	  antibiotic	  molecules	  should	  be	  well	  timed,	  arriving	  when	  needed	  due	  to	  resistance	  rather	  than	  as	  quickly	  as	  possible	  4.	  	  Patents	  are	  clumsy	  policy	  levers	  for	  antibiotic	  policy	  because	  pollution	  externalities	  differ	  in	  each	  drug-­‐bug	  combination	  
Explore	  alternative	  de-­‐linkage	  mechanisms,	  such	  as	  reimbursement,	  prizes	  and	  aHIF	  5.	  	  Resistance	  is	  a	  global	  problem	   Solutions	  must	  be	  scalable	  across	  the	  globe	  and	  cannot	  depend	  on	  the	  existence	  of	  highly	  functional	  governments	  and	  infrastructure	  in	  poor	  countries	  6.	  	  Antibiotic	  innovation	  is	  broken	   Managing	  pollution	  externalities	  is	  difficult	  and	  complex	  	  The	   first	   is	   the	   effect	   of	   conservation	   upon	   incentives	   for	   R&D	   of	   new	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
29 Fernando Baquero, Teresa M. Coque, Fernando de la Cruz, Ecology and Evolution as Targets: the Need 
for Novel Eco-Evo Drugs and Strategies To Fight Antibiotic Resistance, 55 ANTIMICROBIAL AGENTS AND 
CHEMOTHERAPY 3649-60 (2011) (“Classical measures trying to contain or slow locally the progress of 
antibiotic resistance in patients on the basis of better antibiotic prescribing policies have clearly become 
insufficient at the global level. Urgent measures are needed to directly confront the processes influencing 
antibiotic resistance pollution in the microbiosphere. Recent interdisciplinary research indicates that new 
eco-evo drugs and strategies, which take ecology and evolution into account, have a promising role in 
resistance prevention, decontamination, and the eventual restoration of antibiotic susceptibility.”) 
30 Kesselheim	  &	  Outterson,	  supra	  note	  2. 
v.12	  –	  DRAFT	   	   10/31/11	  
	   15	  
antibiotics. 31 	  	   Both	   conservation	   and	   R&D	   are	   laudable,	   but	   in	   many	   ways	  conservation	  and	  R&D	  work	  at	  cross-­‐purposes,	  and	  difficult	  choices	  must	  be	  made	  between	   them.	   	   For	   example,	   insofar	   as	   antibiotic	   conservation	   is	   successful	   in	  curbing	  inappropriate	  use	  and	  maintaining	  the	  effectiveness	  of	  existing	  products,	  it	  will	  suppress	  demand	  for	  new	  antibiotics.	  	  Viewed	  from	  the	  dynamic	  perspective	  of	  R&D	   into	   new	   drugs,	   conservation	   programs	   undercut	   market	   incentives	   by	  dampening	   future	   demand.32	  	   But	   from	   the	   static	   perspective	   of	   public	   health,	  conservation	   is	  an	  unqualified	  success	  when	   infections	  are	  prevented	  or	  antibiotic	  resistance	  averted.	   	   In	  an	  optimally	  coordinated	  market,	   current	  antibiotics	  would	  be	   conserved	   for	   as	   long	   as	  possible	   and	  new	  ones	   introduced	  on	   a	   “just	   in	   time”	  basis,	   perhaps	   with	   some	   antibiotics	   held	   in	   a	   Strategic	   Antibiotic	   Reserve	   for	  emergencies.33	  	  This	  sort	  of	  coordination	  is	  terribly	  difficult	  at	  present,	  but	  might	  be	  a	  key	  advantage	  of	  the	  aHIF.	  	   The	  second	  problem	  is	  the	  financial	   incentives	  that	  the	  market	  gives	  to	  drug	  companies,	   hospitals,	   physicians,	   pharmacists	   and	   informal	   health	   care	   workers	  around	  the	  globe.34	  	  All	  of	  these	  parties	  are	  rewarded	  by	  moving	  product,	  especially	  through	  increased	  unit	  sales	  of	  antibiotics.	  	  A	  sale	  yields	  the	  same	  profit	  whether	  the	  use	   is	   actually	   appropriate	   or	   not.	   	   In	   ordinary	   drugs,	   this	   situation	   is	  wasteful	   if	  money	   is	   spent	   unnecessarily	   or	   dangerous	   if	   patients	   are	   needlessly	   exposed	   to	  pharmaceutical	   risks.	   	   With	   antibiotics,	   the	   damage	   of	   inappropriate	   use	   is	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
31 Legal	  Ecology,	  supra	  note	  2,	  at	  628.	   
32 Id. 
33 Kesselheim	  &	  Outterson,	  supra	  note	  2.	  34	  Towards	  New	  Business	  Models,	  supra	  note	  2;	  Kesselheim	  &	  Outterson,	  supra	  note	  2;	  Aaron	  S.	  Kesselheim	  &	  Kevin	  Outterson,	  Improving	  Antibiotic	  Markets	  for	  Long	  Term	  Sustainability,	  11	  YALE	  J.	  HEALTH	  POL’Y,	  L.	  &	  ETHICS	  101,	  155	  (2011)	  [hereinafter,	  Improving	  Antibiotic	  Markets]. 
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multiplied	  because	  misuse	  promotes	   resistance,	   destroying	   the	  power	  of	   the	  drug	  for	  future	  patients	  as	  well.	  	  	  Companies	   also	   sell	   antibiotics	   for	   animal	   use.	   	   Most	   US	   antibiotic	   sales	   (by	  volume)	   are	   for	   use	   in	   healthy	   animals,	   which	   raises	   the	   potential	   of	   resistant	  organisms	  developing	  in	  animal	  hosts.	  	  Restricting	  such	  sales	  might	  promote	  human	  health,	   but	   would	   lower	   profits	   for	   drug	   companies	   and	   raise	   costs	   for	   some	  farmers.	   	   The	   aHIF	   would	   give	   companies	   an	   incentive	   to	   limit	   nontherapeutic	  agricultural	  uses,	  saving	  antibiotics	  for	  human	  use.	  	  	  	   Patent	  systems	  recover	  R&D	  costs	  through	  pricing	  above	  marginal	  cost.	  Firms	  will	  have	  incentives	  to	  exploit	  their	  patent	  through	  over-­‐producing	  (relative	  to	  the	  social	  optimum)	  during	  the	  exclusivity	  period.	  Nor	  is	  it	  clear	  that	  society	  would	  be	  well	  served	  by	  pricing	  at	  marginal	  cost:	  	  unlike	  many	  drugs	  with	  deadweight	  losses	  due	  to	  lost	  sales,	  overuse	  of	  antibiotics	  could	  be	  welfare-­‐reducing	  due	  to	  resistance.	  	  The	   aHIF	   could	   rationalize	   these	   incentives	   by	   paying	   for	   health	   impact,	   not	   just	  product	  sales.	  	  	  	   The	   third	   quandary	   is	   the	   relationship	   between	   resistance	   and	   innovation.	  	  The	   conventional	   wisdom	   assumes	   that	   resistance	   is	   a	   problem	   in	   antibiotic	  innovation,	   but	   resistance	  may	   also	   stimulate	   innovation.35	  	   In	   other	   drug	   classes,	  new	  entrants	  must	  compete	  against	  generic	  drugs	  with	  proven	  records	  of	  safety	  and	  efficacy.	  	  Lipitor	  (atorvastatin)	  is	  an	  excellent	  statin,	  and	  when	  it	  transitions	  to	  fully	  generic	  status,	  atorvastatin	  will	  set	  a	  high	  bar	  against	  which	  new	  statin	  drugs	  must	  be	   measured.	   	   Importantly,	   the	   use	   of	   atorvastatin	   by	   one	   person	   does	   not	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  35	  Projan,	  supra	  note	  18;	  Towards	  New	  Business	  Models,	  supra	  note	  2;	  Legal	  Ecology,	  supra	  note	  2,	  at	  637.	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undermine	   its	  value	   for	  any	  other	  person:	   	   the	  billionth	  dose	   is	   just	  as	  effective	  as	  the	  first.	  	  None	  of	  this	  is	  true	  for	  antibiotics.	  	  Penicillin	  was	  an	  outstanding	  antibiotic,	  perhaps	  better	  than	  almost	  anything	  we	  have	  seen	  in	  many	  decades.	  	  But	  resistance	  makes	  highly	  effective	  antibiotics	  obsolete	  over	  time,	  which	  clears	  the	  competitive	  field	   before	   a	   new	   drug	   enters	   the	  market.	   	   This	   trend	   of	   declining	   effectiveness	  favors	  entry	  of	  new	  antibiotic	  molecules.	   	  Paradoxically,	   speeding	  market	  entry	  of	  antibiotics	   may	   actually	   accelerate	   resistance,	   by	   flooding	   the	   market	   with	  competing	  drugs	  that	  trigger	  another	  round	  of	  resistance.36	  	  The	  aHIF	  would	  reward	  well-­‐timed	   antibiotic	   introductions,	   which	   arrive	   to	   address	   the	   greatest	   human	  health	  needs.	  	   The	   fourth	   issue	   concerns	   the	   policy	   levers	   employed	   in	   the	   battle	   against	  antibiotic	  resistance.	  	  Prior	  scholarship	  has	  been	  perhaps	  too	  quick	  to	  turn	  to	  patent	  law	  as	   the	  preferred	  policy	   lever.	   	   For	   example,	   the	   Infectious	  Diseases	   Society	   of	  America	   (IDSA)	   has	   catalogued	   the	   thin	   pipeline	   of	   new	   antibiotic	   therapies,	   but	  called	  for	  significant	  changes	  in	  patent	  law	  to	  remedy	  the	  problem,	  including	  patent	  extensions	  and	  wildcard	  patent	  extensions	  for	  antibiotics.37	  	  In	  our	  view,	  patent	  law	  mechanisms	  are	  ill	  suited	  to	  address	  the	  resistance	  problem,	  in	  part	  because	  patent	  law	  is	  not	   flexible	  enough	  to	  be	  carefully	  calibrated	  to	  the	  biological	  complexity	  of	  resistance.38	  	   The	   traditional	   advantage	   of	   patent	   law	   is	   its	   reliance	   on	   market	  pricing,	   but	  many	  pharmaceutical	   prices	   are	   not	   really	   set	   by	   the	  market,	   but	   are	  governed	   by	   public	   reimbursement	   systems.	   	   In	   effect,	   elements	   of	   the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  36	  Legal	  Ecology,	  supra	  note	  2,	  at	  637.	  37	  BAD	  BUGS,	  NO	  DRUGS,	  supra note 7;	  Infectious	  Diseases	  Society	  of	  America,	  supra	  note	  1.	  	  38	  Vanishing	  Public	  Domain,	  supra	  note	  28;	  Improving	  Antibiotic	  Markets,	  supra	  note	  34.	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pharmaceutical	  market	   are	   already	   de-­‐linked,	   but	   not	   in	   a	   system	   that	   prioritizes	  global	   health	   impact.39	  	   To	   the	   extent	   that	   market-­‐based	   pricing	   is	   an	   important	  element	  of	   the	  patent	  system,	   its	  absence	   in	  pharmaceuticals	   is	  quite	   troubling.	   	   If	  the	   primary	   market	   signals	   are	   muddled	   or	   broken,	   additional	   modifications	   to	  patent	  law	  should	  not	  be	  rolled	  out	  before	  the	  reimbursement	  system	  is	  fixed.40	  	  The	  aHIF	   side	   steps	   these	  problems	  by	   creating	   a	   new	  de-­‐linkage	  mechanism	   to	   focus	  reimbursement	  on	  the	  most	  socially	  desirable	  pharmaceutical	  innovations.	  Resistance	   spreads	   globally	   across	   political	   and	   geographic	   boundaries,	  giving	  rise	  to	  our	  fifth	  policy	  concern:	  	  antibiotic	  resistance	  is	  an	  ecological	  pollution	  problem	  that	  requires	  global	  coordination	  mechanisms	  that	  are	  not	  currently	  being	  provided	  by	  the	  market.	  	  Global	  coordination	  through	  the	  WHO	  is	  poorly	  funded	  and	  focused	   on	   conservation.	   	   Global	   coordination	   through	   the	   patent	   system	   is	  unhelpfully	   devoted	   to	   selling	   new	   drugs.	   	   As	   described	   above,	   conservation	   and	  new	   drug	   R&D	   incentives	   work	   at	   cross-­‐purposes.	   	   By	   paying	   for	   human	   health	  impact	  anywhere	  on	  the	  planet,	  the	  aHIF	  would	  be	  uniquely	  well	  placed	  to	  globally	  coordinate	  these	  issues.	  	  	  	  	  Finally,	   the	   antibiotic	   innovation	   system	   is	   not	   functioning	  well.	   	   Compare	  antibiotic	   innovation	  with	   information	   technology:	   	  what	   if	   successive	  generations	  of	   laptops	   were	   larger	   and	   slower	   with	   diminished	   capabilities?	   	   Or	   suffered	  incremental	   safety	   problems	  with	   each	   new	  model?	   	   No	   one	  would	   consider	   that	  situation	   acceptable	   for	   laptop	   innovation,	   and	   yet	   that	   is	   the	   landscape	   for	  antibiotics.	   	  Today’s	  antibiotics	  are	  in	  many	  ways	  inferior	  to	  the	  drugs	  available	   in	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  39	  Kesselheim	  &	  Outterson,	  supra	  note	  2.	  40	  Id.	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1950;	   most	   of	   the	   antibiotics	   approved	   in	   the	   “glory	   days”	   of	   the	   1980s	   were	  subsequently	  withdrawn	  from	  the	  market,	  many	  with	  safety	  problems.41	  	  Antibiotics	  suffer	  from	  an	  innovation	  deficit.	  	  	  	  But	   a	   significant	   increase	   in	   antibiotic	   drug	   approvals	   may	   not	   solve	   the	  problem.42	  	  	  	  Companies	  are	  rewarded	  based	  on	  antibiotic	  unit	  sales,	  and	  often	  focus	  on	   the	   wrong	   types	   of	   innovation.	   	   In	   many	   antibiotic	   drugs,	   resistance	   can	   be	  transmitted	  within	   the	  antibiotic	  drug	  class	   to	  other	  drugs	   in	   the	  class,	  permitting	  market	  rivals	  to	  pollute	  on	  their	  competitors’	  drugs.	  	  These	  resistance	  patterns	  can	  vary	   between	   different	   bacterial	   species.	   	   In	   this	   ecological	   context,	   bringing	  additional	   “me-­‐too”	   drugs	   to	   market	   within	   an	   existing	   class	   can	   speed	   the	  destruction	  of	  all	  drugs	  in	  the	  class.	  	  Cross-­‐class	  resistance	  complicates	  the	  problem	  even	  more,	  as	  the	  pollution	  affects	  more	  distant	  drugs.43	  	  	  A	  patent	  race	  that	  results	  in	   too	  many	  molecules	   reaching	   the	  market	   at	   the	   same	   time	   is	   not	   success,	   but	  failure.	   	   Multiple	   simultaneous	   entries	   of	   antibiotics	   with	   pollution	   externalities	  should	  be	  considered	  uncoordinated	  withdrawals	  by	  competitors	  from	  a	  potentially	  exhaustible	  common	  pool.44	  	  	  	  Such	  races	  may	  drive	  resistance	  instead	  of	  improving	  human	  health.	  	  	  Antibiotic	   pollution	   externalities	   could	   potentially	   be	   managed	   by	   Coasian	  contractual	  mechanisms	  between	  companies	  producing	  antibiotics.	  	  The	  number	  of	  patent-­‐owning	   firms	   involved	   is	   relatively	   small,	   but	   cooperation	   in	   this	   fashion	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  41Enrique	  Seoane-­‐Vazquez,	  Jing	  Hao,	  &	  Rosa	  Rodriguez-­‐Monguio,	  Exploring	  the	  Relationship	  Between	  
Drug	  Patent	  Life	  and	  Drug	  Approvals,	  (abstract),	  American	  Public	  Health	  Association	  (2011)	  (available	  at	  http://apha.confex.com/apha/139am/webprogram/Paper246364.html).	  42	  Kevin	  Outterson,	  John	  H.	  Powers,	  Ian	  M.	  Gould,	  &	  Aaron	  S.	  Kesselheim,	  Questions	  About	  the	  10	  x	  ’20	  
Initiative,	  51	  CLIN.	  INFECT.	  DIS.	  751	  (2010).	  43	  Vanishing	  Public	  Domain,	  supra	  note	  28;	  Improving	  Antibiotic	  Markets,	  supra	  note	  34.	   44Laxminarayan	  &	  Malani,	  supra	  note	  2.	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would	  run	  afoul	  of	  the	  antitrust	  statutes	  in	  the	  US	  and	  competition	  laws	  around	  the	  world.	  	  As	  a	  result,	  limited	  antitrust	  waivers	  would	  be	  required	  for	  any	  coordinating	  mechanism	  between	  the	  companies.45	  	  But	  antibiotic	  pollution	  also	  affects	  society	  at	  large,	  greatly	  increasing	  the	  number	  of	  persons	  involved.	   	  Once	  the	  patent	  expires,	  the	  number	  of	  polluting	  firms	  can	  increase	  significantly.	  	  Finally,	  antibiotic	  pollution	  externalities	  vary	  significantly	  depending	  on	  how	  the	  antibiotic	  is	  used,	  making	  the	  contractual	  solution	  even	  more	  difficult	  to	  manage.	  	  	  A	  related	  problem	  involves	  truly	  innovative	  antibiotics,	  especially	  drugs	  with	  entirely	   new	  mechanisms	   of	   action.	   	   These	   antibiotics	   are	   the	   first	   entrant	   into	   a	  new	   “functional	   resistance	   group.”46	  	  To	   the	   extent	   that	   competitors’	   actions	  don’t	  damage	   the	  new	  drug,	   then	   the	  patent	  owner	  need	  not	   fear	  obsolescence	   through	  resistance	  pollution.	  	  But	  the	  patent	  clock	  ticks	  on,	  since	  the	  company	  owns	  a	  time-­‐limited	  property	  right.	   	  The	  company	  has	  every	  incentive	  to	  bring	  this	  molecule	  to	  market	   quickly,	   even	   absent	   either	   urgent	   clinical	   need	   or	   pollution	   risk.	   	   This	  market	   introduction	   begins	   the	   countdown	   to	   resistance	   for	   a	   new	   functional	  resistance	   group	   of	   antibiotics.	   	   In	   short,	   the	   patent	   holder	   has	   strong	   financial	  incentives	  to	  waste	  the	  antibiotic,	  even	  if	  clinically	  appropriate	  alternatives	  exist.47	  	  For	  these	  first-­‐in-­‐class	  antibiotics,	  society	  would	  be	  better	  served	  by	  keeping	  these	  drugs	   off	   the	   market	   until	   clinically	   necessary.	   	   One	   potential	   solution	   is	   the	  Strategic	  Antibiotic	  Reserve	  (Reserve),	  which	  would	  pay	  patent	  owners	  handsomely	  to	   entirely	   forgo	   marketing	   the	   drug	   class	   until	   the	   day	   that	   resistance	   to	   other	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  45	  Improving	  Antibiotic	  Markets,	  supra	  note	  34,	  at	  112.	   46Laxminarayan	  &	  Malani,	  supra	  note	  2.	  47	  Vanishing	  Public	  Domain,	  supra	  note	  38,	  at	  103-­‐4.	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drugs	  necessitated	  a	  withdrawal	  from	  the	  Reserve.48	  	  	  	  The	  analogy	  is	  to	  the	  strategic	  petroleum	   reserve,	   saving	   an	   exhaustible	   resource	   for	   a	   day	  of	   utmost	  need.	   	   The	  Reserve	  is	  distinguished	  from	  the	  aHIF	  in	  that	  it	  pays	  for	  not	  using	  a	  drug,	  based	  on	  estimated	  future	  health	  impact.	   	  The	  Reserve	  and	  the	  aHIF	  are	  complementary	  but	  distinct	  proposals.	  
IV. The	  Antibiotic	  Health	  Impact	  Fund	  (aHIF)	  In	  the	  following	  pages,	  we	  explore	  first	  the	  details	  of	  how	  the	  aHIF	  would	  impact	  R&D	  incentives	  for	  antibiotics,	  before	  turning	  to	  the	  issue	  of	  conservation.	  	  In	  both	  cases,	  the	  aHIF	  may	  be	  able	  to	  solve	  vexing	  problems	  in	  this	  sector,	  serving	  as	  a	  global	  coordinating	  mechanism	  to	  simultaneously	  promote	  appropriate	  use	  as	  well	  as	  boosting	  incentives	  for	  bringing	  important	  new	  antibiotics	  to	  market	  at	  the	  right	  time.	  	  The	  aHIF	  could	  encompass	  all	  systemic	  antibacterials	  for	  human	  use,	  or	  it	  could	  be	  more	  narrowly	  focused	  on	  antibiotics	  for	  hospital	  use,	  where	  the	  resistance	  problems	  are	  greatest	  and	  the	  potential	  for	  conservation	  gains	  more	  readily	  attainable.	  	  
A. The	  aHIF	  as	  a	  global	  coordination	  mechanism	  for	  new	  antibiotic	  
development	  	  	   The	  aHIF	  is	  very	  appealing	  as	  a	  global	  coordination	  mechanism	  for	  antibiotic	  R&D.	   	   For	   the	   first	   time,	   companies	  would	   be	   rewarded	   for	   producing	   antibiotics	  that	  were	  better	   than	  existing	  therapies,	  with	  the	  target	  being	  actual	   improvement	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  48	  Kesselheim	  &	  Outterson,	  supra	  note	  2;	  Improving	  Antibiotic	  Markets,	  supra	  note	  34,	  at	  160-­‐61. 
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in	   human	   health	   as	   opposed	   to	   mere	   growth	   in	   unit	   sales.	   The	   aHIF	   would	   not	  function	   as	   a	   bureaucratic	   expert	   panel	   picking	   “winning”	   research	   programs.	  	  Companies	  would	  continue	  to	  evaluate	  and	  prioritize	  their	  own	  research	  programs,	  but	  the	  aHIF	  reward	  will	  be	  proportional	  to	  the	  health	  impact	  rather	  than	  the	  ability	  to	  generate	  sales	  in	  high-­‐income	  countries	  through	  aggressive	  marketing.	  	  The	  aHIF	  would	  offer	   little	  or	  no	  reward	   to	  a	  company	   for	  switching	  patients	   from	  an	  older	  but	  still	  effective	  antibiotic	  to	  its	  own,	  brand-­‐new,	  aHIF-­‐registered	  product	  because	  the	  incremental	  health	  impact	  would	  be	  slight.	  	  Under	  aHIF,	  the	  new	  market	  entrant	  does	  not	  appropriate	  the	  entire	  profit	  the	  other	  company	  derived	  from	  its	  existing	  sales,	  but	  only	  gets	   rewarded	   if	   and	   insofar	  as	   the	   switch	   is	  beneficial	   to	  patients’	  health.	  	  New	  antibiotics	  will	  receive	  aHIF	  rewards	  only	  to	  the	  extent	  it	  addresses	  an	  unmet	  need	  in	  human	  health,	  which	  dramatically	  re-­‐orients	  antibiotic	  R&D	  goals	  in	  a	  socially	  desirable	  way.	  	  	   The	  HIF	  has	  been	  initially	  scaled	  in	  the	  range	  of	  US$6	  billion	  per	  year	  over	  10	  years.	   	  While	  US$6	  billion	  is	  a	  relatively	  small	  percentage	  of	  global	  pharmaceutical	  sales,	  the	  aHIF	  would	  have	  a	  much	  more	  salient	  impact	  within	  the	  antibiotic	  class	  of	  drugs.	   	   US	   sales	   of	   systemic	   antibacterial	   drugs	   were	   US$11.2	   billion	   in	   2008;49	  global	   sales	   were	   approximately	   US$42	   billion	   in	   2009.50	  	   If	   additional	   focus	   was	  desired,	   the	   aHIF	   could	   be	   limited	   at	   first	   to	   antibiotics	   for	   hospital	   use,	  which	   is	  where	  the	  most	  serious	  resistance	  and	  infection	  issues	  are	  located.	  	  The	  aHIF	  would	  dramatically	  boost	  innovation	  incentives	  in	  this	  drug	  class,	  and	  serve	  an	  important	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  49	  IMS	  Midas	  (2010),	  IMS	  Health,	  Inc.	  (available	  at	  http://www.imshealth.com).	  	  Sales	  at	  ex-­‐manufacturer	  prices	  (=manufacturer	  invoice).	  Includes	  rebates	  and	  certain	  discounts.	  	  Sales	  at	  consumer	  prices	  would	  include	  wholesaler	  cost	  and	  pharmacy	  fees.	  50	  Bashar	  Hamad,	  The	  Antibiotics	  Market,	  9	  NATURE	  REVIEWS	  DRUG	  DISCOVERY	  675,	  675-­‐76	  (2010).	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coordinating	   function	   by	   steering	   the	   work	   towards	   antibiotics	   with	   the	   greatest	  potential	  global	  health	  impact.	  	  Investing	  US$6	  billion	  per	  year	  in	  this	  fashion	  would	  likely	  be	  very	  efficient,	  since	  the	  social	  value	  of	  the	  unmet	  need	  for	  antibiotics	  is	  at	  least	  an	  order	  of	  magnitude	  higher.51	  	  	  	  
B. The	   aHIF	   as	   a	   coordination	   mechanism	   for	   global	   antibiotic	  
conservation	  
	   	  The	   current	   global	   pharmaceutical	   market	   balances	   access	   and	   innovation	  primarily	   upon	   the	   fulcrum	   of	   generic	   entry.	   	   The	   global	   rollout	   of	   low-­‐cost	  antiretroviral	  medicines	  was	  made	  possible	  by	  entry	  of	  generics.52	  	  	  	  Access	  to	  many	  medicines	   improves	   after	   generic	   entry,	   due	   to	   the	   significant	   price	   reductions	  driven	  by	  generic	  competition.	  	  On	  a	  static	  level,	  deadweight	  loss	  is	  reduced	  through	  marginal	  cost	  production	  and	  generic	  distribution	  as	  soon	  as	  possible.	  	  A	  persistent	  criticism	   of	   the	   HIF	   raises	   the	   question	   of	   inadequate	   incentives	   for	   generic	  production.53	  	  Whatever	  traction	  this	  criticism	  may	  or	  may	  not	  have	  in	  general,	  the	  calculus	   is	   different	   for	   antibiotics.	   	   For	   antibiotics,	   paradoxically,	   maximizing	  production	   and	   access	  may	   be	   globally	   counterproductive.54	  	   Policymakers	   should	  avoid	   indiscriminately	   flooding	   the	   market	   with	   vast	   quantities	   of	   low-­‐priced	  generic	   antibiotics.	   	   Inappropriate	   use	   must	   be	   restricted	   through	   antibiotic	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  51	  Kesselheim	  &	  Outterson,	  supra	  note	  2. 52	  JAMES	  LOVE,	  COST	  BENEFIT	  ANALYSIS	  FOR	  UNITAID	  PATENT	  POOL	  (2008),	  http://www.keionline.org/misc-­‐docs/1/cost_benefit_UNITAID_patent_pool.pdf.	  53	  See	  Love,	  supra	  note	  22. 
54 Much empirical work is needed to fully understand this dynamic.  If significant human health needs are 
currently unmet due to inadequate access to existing antibiotics, widespread generic access could improve 
human health. On the other hand, if antibiotics are already widely misused for inappropriate conditions, 
increased generic access could accelerate resistance without offsetting benefits to human health.  One 
ancillary benefit to the aHIF would be the collection and dissemination of surveillance data on these issues. 
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conservation	   if	   long-­‐term	  human	  health	   is	   to	  be	  maximized.	   	  As	  a	   result,	   concerns	  about	  generic	  access	  are	  uniquely	  less	  salient	  for	  the	  aHIF.	  	  
If	  we	  focus	  solely	  on	  producing	  new	  antibiotics	  to	  the	  exclusion	  of	  long-­‐term	  conservation,	   then	  all	  we	  have	  done	  is	   to	  accelerate	  the	  final	  ecological	  collapse	  of	  every	  functional	  resistance	  group	  of	  antibiotics.	  	  Consider	  the	  following	  two	  charts.	  	  The	   first	   is	   the	   oft-­‐repeated	   chart	   on	   the	   decline	   in	   FDA	   approvals	   for	   antibiotics	  over	  the	  previous	  decades:	  55	  
	  
This	  decline	  might	  actually	  be	  a	  hopeful	  sign	  since	  antibiotics	  must	  be	  managed	  for	  long-­‐term	  ecological	  and	  evolutionary	  balance,	  but	   the	   IDSA	  uses	   this	   chart	   to	  ask	  Congress	   for	   additional	   financial	   and	  patent	   incentives	   to	   spur	  production	  of	   new	  antibiotics.56	  	  Conservation	  efforts	  are	  included	  in	  this	  proposed	  legislation,	  but	  the	  new	   financial	   incentives	   are	   not	   conditioned	   on	   meeting	   conservation	   goals.	   The	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
55 Modified from BAD	  BUGS,	  NO	  DRUGS,	  supra note 7.  56	  Antibiotic	  Resistance:	  Promoting	  Critically	  Needed	  Antibiotic	  Research	  and	  Development	  and	  
Appropriate	  Use	  (“Stewardship”)	  of	  These	  Precious	  Drugs,	  Before	  the	  H.	  Comm.	  on	  Energy	  and	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failure	   to	   view	   antibiotic	   resistance	   as	   an	   ecological	   problem	   can	   lead	   to	   grave	  errors.	  	  Consider	  the	  second	  chart,	  historical	  data	  on	  a	  previous	  ecological	  collapse,	  the	  near-­‐extermination	  of	  the	  North	  American	  buffalo	  herds	  in	  the	  1870s:57	  	  
	  
	  	   Confronted	  with	  this	  buffalo	  hide	  export	  data,	  the	  rational	  response	  in	  1877	  should	  be	  to	  stop	  hunting	  buffalo.	  	  It	  would	  have	  been	  a	  grave	  error	  if	  Congress	  had	  increased	   financial	   incentives	   for	   hunting.	   The	   buffalo	   population	  was	   a	   common	  pool	  resource	   that	  suffered	  ecological	  collapse	   through	  unsustainable	  withdrawals	  following	   a	  post-­‐Civil	  War	   innovation	   in	   tanning	   techniques.	   	   Prices	   stayed	  high	  –	  and	   the	  profitability	   of	   exploiting	   the	  herd	  was	  maintained	  –	  because	  of	   the	   large	  export	   market	   for	   hides	   in	   Europe.58	  This	   led	   to	   the	   wholesale	   slaughter	   of	   the	  buffalo	  population	  in	  about	  a	  decade.	  Any	  analogy	  between	  antibiotics	  and	  buffalo	  markets	  should	  be	  approached	  with	   caution.	   	   However,	   the	   common	   pool	   problems	   are	   similar.	   	   Both	   common	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  57	  Taylor,	  supra	  note	  27.	  	   58	  Id.	  	  Other	  economists	  focus	  on	  the	  late	  arrival	  of	  property	  rights	  as	  a	  factor	  in	  the	  near	  extermination	  of	  the	  herd.	  	  Dean	  Lueck,	  The	  Extermination	  and	  Conservation	  of	  the	  American	  Bison,	  31	  J.	  Legal	  Stud.	  609,	  638-­‐39	  (2002).	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pools	   are	   potentially	   expandable	   through	   breeding	   (for	   buffalo)	   and	   new	   drug	  introductions	   (for	   antibiotics),	   and	   can	   be	   depleted	   through	   uncoordinated	  withdrawals	   (buffalo	  hunting	  or	   antibiotic	   pollution).	   	   If	   private	  benefits	   from	   the	  use	  of	  polluting	  antibiotics	  are	  perceived	  to	  be	  high,	  but	  private	  cost	  are	  kept	  very	  low,	  we	   can	   anticipate	  many	  withdrawals	   (antibiotic	   use),	   leading	   to	   the	   onset	   of	  resistance	   unless	   the	   common	   pool	   resource	   is	   managed	   for	   long-­‐term	  sustainability.	   	   Put	   another	  way,	  we	  must	  understand	  global	   antibiotic	   policy	   as	   a	  primarily	   ecological	   and	   evolutionary	   management	   question.59	  	   The	   battle	   against	  microbes	   cannot	   be	   “won.”	   	   Indeed,	   microbes	   are	   a	   significant	   percentage	   of	   our	  body	  weight	  and	  cellular	  census,	  with	  complex	  effects	  on	  health.	  	  The	  long-­‐term	  goal	  is	  a	  sustainable	  balance	  between	  microbes	  and	  humanity.	  	  	  	   In	  the	  HIF,	  long-­‐term	  sustainability	  could	  be	  addressed	  by	  making	  additional	  rewards	   available	   to	   the	   extent	   that	   long-­‐term	   antibiotic	   conservation	   goals	   are	  achieved.	  Conservation	  is	  the	  second	  major	  feature	  of	  our	  proposal,	  after	  de-­‐linkage.	  	  Conservation	  rewards	  are	  the	  mechanism	  for	  global	  antibiotic	  coordination	  through	  the	  HIF.	  	  	  	  	  The	   HIF	   will	   require	   the	   assistance	   of	   public	   health	   experts	   to	   develop	  appropriate	   antibiotic	   conservation	   goals.	   	   Outterson	   and	   Kesselheim	   have	  described	   one	   possible	   model,	   which	   would	   focus	   on	   surveillance	   data	   of	   actual	  resistance	   levels	   as	   the	   key	   metric.	   	   Governments	   would	   set	   the	   conservation	  targets,	   but	   leave	   implementation	   to	   the	   companies	   themselves,	   perhaps	   in	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
59 Baquero, supra note 29. 
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partnership	  with	  governments	  and	  appropriate	  non-­‐governmental	  organizations.60	  	  The	   defining	   feature	   of	   this	  model	   is	   the	   reluctance	   to	   use	   government	   to	   specify	  detailed	   regulations,	   assuming	   that	   the	   companies	   and	   NGOs	   have	   important	  information	   about	   the	   contours	   of	   the	   antibiotic	   markets	   and	   the	   heterogeneous	  policy	  tools	  available	  to	  reduce	  inappropriate	  use.	  	  	  While	  other	  models	  are	  certainly	  possible,	   reliance	   on	   the	   companies,	   in	   partnership	   with	   governments	   and	   NGOs,	  while	  holding	  the	  companies	  accountable	  for	  actual	  resistance	  targets,	  yields	  several	  interesting	   implications.	   	   The	   following	   chart	   summarizes	   these	   issues,	  which	   are	  then	  discussed	  in	  more	  detail	  in	  the	  text:	  
The	  aHIF	  as	  a	  Coordination	  Mechanism	  for	  Global	  Antibiotic	  Conservation.	  
Conservation	   incentives	  
to	  companies	  
Examples	   of	   company	  
implementation	  
Challenges	   for	   the	   aHIF	  
approach	  1. Manage	  their	  antibiotics	  to	  maximize	  health	  impact	  without	  exceeding	  specific	  resistance	  targets	  
Cease	  sales	  of	  animal	  antibiotics	  for	  non-­‐therapeutic	  uses;	  companies	  can	  focus	  their	  considerable	  marketing	  and	  government	  relations	  functions	  on	  appropriate	  use	  
Relies	  primarily	  on	  the	  companies	  to	  lead	  the	  process	  after	  governments	  have	  set	  the	  aHIF	  conservation	  targets	  
2. Coordinate	  activities	  across	  companies	  to	  minimize	  pollution	   Contractual	  agreements	  to	  minimize	  pollution;	  joint	  support	  for	  conservation	  programs,	  infection	  control	  and	  vaccines	  
Requires	  waivers	  to	  antitrust	  law;	  potential	  spillovers	  of	  anticompetitive	  behavior;	  all-­‐or-­‐nothing	  aHIF	  might	  be	  necessary	  3. Manage	  antibiotics	  for	  longer	  time	  horizons	   aHIF	  contracts	  might	  need	  to	  be	  significantly	  longer	  than	  the	  patent	  term,	  tied	  more	  to	  clinical	  realities	  rather	  than	  patent	  life	  
Delays	  generic	  entry;	  longer	  aHIF	  registration	  periods	  might	  be	  necessary	  
4. Solving	  “last	  mile”	  problems	   Subsidize	  rapid	  point-­‐of-­‐care	  diagnostics	  that	  limit	  unit	  sales	  to	  appropriate	  use;	  support	  (rather	  than	  oppose)	  hospital	  formulary	  restrictions	  that	  support	  appropriate	  use	  
Companies	  control	  this	  process	  and	  must	  be	  held	  accountable	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  60Kesselheim	  &	  Outterson,	  supra	  note	  2;	  Improving	  Antibiotic	  Markets,	  supra	  note	  34,	  at	  146-­‐47.	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5. Maximize	  global	  health	  impact	   aHIF	  payment	  and	  conservation	  targets	  would	  be	  based	  on	  global	  health	  impact;	  aHIF	  becomes	  an	  effective	  global	  coordination	  mechanism	  independent	  of	  the	  quality	  of	  local	  governmental	  support	  or	  competence	  
Targets	  must	  be	  set	  appropriately,	  without	  company	  gaming;	  surveillance	  likewise	  must	  be	  independent	  and	  reliable	  
	  	   First,	  companies	  would	  have	  a	  significant	  financial	  incentive	  to	  manage	  their	  antibiotics	   for	   long-­‐term	   public	   health,	   rather	   than	   short-­‐term	   sales.	   	   Companies	  would	  benefit	  most	  from	  getting	  the	  right	  drug	  to	  the	  right	  person	  at	  the	  right	  price,	  and	  would	  deploy	   their	   remarkable	  marketing	   talents	   to	  discourage	   inappropriate	  use.	   	   Companies	  might	   also	  make	   strategic	  market	   decisions.	   	   For	   example,	   Bayer	  owned	  the	  patents	  on	  both	  ciprofloxacin	  and	  a	  related	  antibiotic	  used	  in	  agriculture.	  	  The	  battle	   to	   restrict	  non-­‐therapeutic	  uses	  of	  antibiotics	   in	  animal	   feeds	  would	  be	  transformed	  if	  the	  company’s	  profits	  from	  exploitation	  of	  these	  two	  products	  were	  contingent	   on	   meeting	   conservation	   goals.	   	   In	   the	   current	   regulatory	   battle	   over	  animal	  antibiotics,	  the	  government	  and	  companies	  question	  each	  other’s	  data;	  in	  the	  aHIF,	  companies	  would	  use	  their	  own	  private	  data	  to	  make	  decisions	  to	  forgo	  animal	  sales.	  	  	  Second,	  as	  described	  above,	  the	  biology	  of	  resistance	  might	  require	  multiple	  companies	   to	   coordinate	   their	   actions	   in	  order	   to	  hit	   resistance	   targets,	  maximize	  health	  impact,	  and	  minimize	  antibiotic	  pollution.	  	  Limited	  antitrust	  waivers	  (or	  state	  action	  protection	  via	  the	  aHIF)	  may	  be	  required.	  	  Antibiotic	  pollution	  might	  require	  aHIF	  registration	  to	  be	  an	  all-­‐or-­‐nothing	  offer	  to	  all	  antibiotic	  drugs	  in	  a	  functional	  resistance	  group.	   	  Unlike	  other	   therapeutic	   categories,	   antibiotics	   in	   the	   aHIF	   face	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special	  challenges	  if	  some	  drugs	  are	  in	  the	  program	  but	  others	  –	  polluters	  with	  low	  health	  impact	  –	  remain	  outside.	  	  It	  should	  be	  noted	  that	  any	  company	  with	  an	  aHIF-­‐registered	  antibiotic	  would	  have	  a	  clear	   incentive	   to	  manage	   its	  entire	  portfolio	   in	  order	   to	   achieve	   the	   aHIF	   resistance	   targets,	   even	   if	   it	   required	   changes	   to	  marketing	  plans	  for	  unregistered	  drugs.	   	   In	  this	  way,	  companies	  with	  one	  or	  more	  registered	  products	  would	  enjoy	  financial	  rewards	  for	  carefully	  managing	  even	  their	  antibiotics	  that	  are	  outside	  the	  aHIF.	  	  It	  must	  be	  conceded	  that	  some	  companies	  might	  remain	  entirely	  outside	  the	  aHIF	   and	   yet	   choose	   to	   market	   their	   drugs	   in	   a	   fashion	   that	   polluted	   other	  antibiotics,	   including	  registered	  products.	   	  Such	  extreme	  cases	  might	  call	   for	  other	  remedies,	   including	   denying	   (or	   revoking)	  market	   access	   for	   such	   polluting,	   low-­‐value	  drugs	  on	  public	  health	  grounds,	  or	  mandating	  registration	  with	  the	  aHIF.	  	  This	  is	  an	  empirical	  question	  that	  should	  not	  be	  answered	  a	  priori;	  we	  simply	  don’t	  know	  yet	   whether	   cross-­‐company	   antibiotic	   pollution	   from	   non-­‐aHIF	   companies	   will	  undermine	  aHIF	  conservation	  goals	  to	  a	  significant	  degree.	  Third,	   since	  resistance	  emerges	  gradually	  over	   time,	   the	  proper	   time	   frame	  for	  the	  aHIF	  might	  be	  much	   longer	  than	  ten	  years.	   If	  an	  antibiotic	  remained	   in	  the	  aHIF	   for	   20	   years	   or	   more	   with	   significant	   continuing	   health	   impact,	   then	   the	  company	   should	   continue	   to	   receive	   the	   reward,	   so	   long	   as	   it	   met	   the	   resistance	  targets.	   	   New	   antibiotics	   might	   be	   delayed,	   especially	   ones	   not	   quite	   as	   good	   as	  existing	  drugs,	  but	  that	  need	  not	  bother	  us.	  	  Indeed,	  social	  welfare	  over	  the	  coming	  decades	  would	  be	  enhanced	  by	  just	  such	  a	  delay,	  saving	  these	  drugs	  for	  a	  time	  when	  resistance	  to	  other	  drugs	  has	  improved	  the	  relative	  effectiveness	  of	  this	  new	  drug.	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In	   addition	   to	   stretching	   the	   aHIF	   reward	   period	   beyond	   the	   usual	   10	   years	   for	  antibiotics,	  one	  might	  also	  consider	  delaying	  the	  start	  of	   the	  aHIF	  period	   for	  some	  antibiotics	  that	  are	  not	  urgently	  required.	  Here	  the	  aim	  would	  be	  to	  encourage	  the	  innovator	  to	  delay	  efforts	  to	  achieve	  extensive	  use	  of	  its	  product	  to	  the	  future	  period	  in	  which	  such	  wide	  use	  can	  make	  the	  greatest	  contribution	  to	  global	  health.	  Limited	  use	   for	   extreme	   cases	   might	   be	   appropriate	   during	   these	   Strategic	   Antimicrobial	  Reserve	  periods.	  	  Fourth,	   companies	  will	  be	   incentivized	   to	   solve	  many	  significant	   “last	  mile”	  problems	  in	  antibiotics.	   	  One	  such	  problem	  involves	  the	  availability	  of	  rapid	  point-­‐of-­‐care	   diagnostics	   to	   distinguish	   between	   viral	   and	   bacterial	   infections.	   	   In	   the	  absence	   of	   such	   a	   test,	   many	   clinicians	   resort	   to	   empiric	   therapy	   with	   broad	  spectrum	  antibiotics.	  	  Treating	  a	  virus	  with	  antibiotics	  does	  not	  affect	  the	  virus,	  but	  may	   negatively	   affect	   the	   health	   of	   the	   patient	   while	   also	   facilitating	   resistance.	  	  From	   the	   financial	  perspective	  of	   a	  drug	   company	   that	   is	   selling	   antibiotics	  under	  the	  current	  system	  of	   incentives,	   these	  diagnostics	  can	  only	  decrease	   its	   sales	  and	  are	   therefore	   financially	   undesirable.	   	   In	   contrast,	   under	   the	   aHIF,	   the	   company	  would	   have	   a	   significant	   financial	   incentive	   to	   promote	   appropriate	   use	   of	  diagnostics.	  	  Likewise,	  antibacterial	  vaccines	  dampen	  the	  demand	  for	  antibiotics	  by	  reducing	  the	  incidence	  of	  bacterial	  illness.	  	  Companies	  with	  antibacterial	  vaccines	  in	  the	   aHIF	   would	   be	   financially	   rewarded	   for	   preventing	   the	   spread	   of	   disease	  through	   vaccination.	   	   Similar	   infrastructure	   issues	   include	   infection	   control	  measures	  and	  resistance	  surveillance;	   these	  tasks	  do	  not	  have	  an	   insurance	  billing	  code	  in	  most	  countries	  and	  are	  frequently	  left	  to	  public	  health	  agencies	  with	  limited	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budgets.	  	  Companies	  with	  antibiotics	  in	  the	  aHIF	  would	  have	  a	  financial	  incentive	  to	  support	   these	   efforts	   in	   whatever	   way	   the	   companies	   thought	   maximized	   health	  impact.	   	   In	   a	   similar	   fashion,	   the	   companies	   would	   deploy	   their	   impressive	  marketing,	   public	   relations,	   and	   lobbying	   operations	   in	   support	   of	   antibiotic	  conservation,	  rather	  than	  opposing	  these	  efforts	  through	  aggressive	  marketing	  and	  other	  tools.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   Finally,	  most	  current	  efforts	   to	  conserve	  antibiotics	  are	  not	  global	   in	  scope.	  Global	   coordination	   is	   a	   significant	   collective	   action	   problem,	   akin	   to	   unregulated	  depletion	   of	   fisheries	   or	   pollution	   that	   falls	   on	   distant	   countries.	   	   Many	   of	   the	  benefits	   of	   antibiotic	   use	   are	   internalized,	   but	  many	   of	   the	   costs	   are	   externalized.	  	  The	  WHO’s	  program	  in	  2011-­‐2012,	  while	  laudable	  in	  aspirations,	  is	  not	  well	  funded	  and	  lacks	  both	  enforcement	  and	  norm-­‐setting	  mechanisms.	  	  The	  aHIF	  could	  serve	  a	  significant	  global	  coordination	  role	  here,	  leveraging	  funding	  from	  the	  aHIF	  sponsors	  into	   a	   true	   global	   strategy	   implemented	   with	   the	   enthusiastic	   support	   of	   private	  actors.	   	  The	  aHIF	  would	  give	   the	  global	  drug	  companies	  a	  direct	  stake	   in	  reducing	  the	   global	   health	   impact	   of	   communicable	   bacterial	   diseases	   while	   managing	   the	  common	   pool	   resource	   of	   antibiotics	   for	   the	   long-­‐term	   health	   of	   the	   global	  population.	   	  The	  companies	  are	  well	  positioned	  to	  influence	  the	  utilization	  of	  their	  products	   in	   every	   region	   of	   the	   planet.	   	   Since	   the	   companies	   themselves	   largely	  undertake	   the	   task,	   this	  mechanism	   can	   succeed	  without	   regard	   to	   the	   quality	   of	  local	  governance	  institutions.	  	  The	  aHIF	  is	  therefore	  scalable	  throughout	  the	  world,	  despite	  weak	  health	  governance	  in	  many	  countries.	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C. Patent-­‐related	  issues	  for	  the	  aHIF	  	  As	  described	  above,	   the	  precise	  patent	  policy	  of	   the	  HIF	   is	  not	   an	  essential	  design	  feature,	  but	  a	   functional	  and	  practical	  choice	  at	   this	  stage.	   	  We	  can	  think	  of	  several	  reasons	  why	  various	  patent	  policies	  might	  work	  with	  the	  HIF	  generally,	  but	  in	  many	  cases	  the	  analysis	  is	  significantly	  different	  for	  the	  aHIF.	  	  	  
First,	  by	  transferring	  the	  patent,	  the	  company	  would	  lose	  the	  right	  to	  control	  certain	   follow-­‐on	   innovations,	   which	   are	   commercially	   important	   in	   many	   drug	  classes.	   	  For	  the	  aHIF,	  this	  issue	  may	  be	  less	  salient,	  as	  a	  successful	  aHIF	  will	  delay	  the	   clinical	   and	   financial	   need	   for	   follow-­‐on	   antibiotics.	   	   In	   antibiotics,	   we	   don’t	  necessarily	  want	  to	  promote	  additional	  drugs	   in	  class	  on	  an	  accelerated	  timetable.	  	  Society	   may	   be	   better	   off	   with	   spreading	   antibiotic	   approvals	   across	   a	   larger	  number	   of	   years,	   coupled	  with	   strong	   conservation	   incentives.	   	   In	   any	   event,	   the	  aHIF	  might	  need	  to	  be	  an	  all-­‐or-­‐nothing	  program,	  especially	  if	  cross-­‐drug	  and	  cross-­‐class	  pollution	  could	  not	  otherwise	  be	  controlled.	  	  	  	  	  
Second,	   retaining	   the	   patent	   gives	   the	   company	   additional	   control	   over	  operational	   issues	   such	   as	   how	   the	   drug	   is	   used	   in	   drug	   combinations,	   with	  companion	  diagnostics,	  and	  potential	  early	  exit	  rights	  under	  the	  aHIF	  contract.	   	  All	  of	   these	   issues	   are	   enmeshed	  with	   the	   antibiotic	   pollution	   externalities	   described	  above:	   in	   many	   cases,	   combination	   drugs	   offer	   much	   lower	   resistance	   profiles;	  companion	   diagnostics	   targets	   the	   right	   drug	   against	   the	   right	   bug	   without	  inappropriate	   use;	   but	   early	   exit	   may	   need	   to	   be	   discouraged	   or	   contractually	  limited	  in	  order	  to	  protect	  drugs	  remaining	  in	  the	  aHIF	  from	  pollution.	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One	  advantage	  of	  an	  immediate	  transfer	  (or	  open	  license)	  of	  the	  patent	  for	  a	  HIF-­‐registered	   product	   is	   that	   it	   shifts	   competition	   from	   the	   molecule	   to	   finding	  more	  efficient	  manufacturing	  methods	  that	  might	  significantly	  reduce	  the	  marginal	  cost	   of	   production.	   	   While	   the	   company	   contractually	   promises	   production	   at	  marginal	   cost,	   the	  HIF	  does	  not	  necessarily	  create	  competitive	  conditions	  wherein	  companies	  strive	  to	  drive	  those	  costs	  down.	  In	  economic	  terms,	  the	  HIF	  will	  address	  the	  great	  majority	  of	  the	  deadweight	  loss	  associated	  with	  patent-­‐based	  pricing,	  but	  may	  forego	  some	  opportunities	  for	  additional	  social	  welfare	  gains	  through	  reduced	  marginal	  costs.	  	  Insofar	  as	  manufacturing	  is	  outsourced,	  the	  incentive	  to	  reduce	  the	  marginal	  cost	  of	  production	   for	  HIF-­‐registered	  products	   is	  powerful,	  as	  competing	  manufacturers	   will	   want	   to	   be	   able	   to	   submit	   the	   lowest	   bid.	   Insofar	   as	  manufacturing	  is	  not	  outsourced,	  the	  firm	  will	  still	  want	  to	  lower	  its	  manufacturing	  cost.	  For	  even	  if	  the	  firm’s	  best	  option	  is	  to	  sell	  at	  cost,	  regardless	  of	  what	  this	  cost	  is,	  the	  firm	  will	  achieve	  more	  health	  impact	  if	  the	  product	  is	  sold	  at	  a	  lower	  price.	  The	  firm	  is	  better	  off	  producing	  and	  selling	  at	  $4	  than	  at	  $5.	  	  	   In	   the	   context	   of	   antibiotics,	   these	   issues	   are	   muted	   somewhat,	   since	  maximizing	   production	   volume	   and	   minimizing	   unit	   costs	   are	   not	   the	   primary	  objectives.	   	   Indeed,	   universal	   misuse	   of	   free	   antibiotics	   would	   be	   a	   public	   health	  problem.	   	   A	   key	   issue	   here	   is	   that	   while	   the	   aHIF	   could	   stretch	   out	   or	   delay	   the	  reward	   period	   for	   antibiotics,	   such	   that	   the	   incentives	   for	   conservation	   were	  adequate,	  patents	  would	  inevitably	  expire,	  opening	  a	  path	  for	  uncontrolled	  generic	  production.	   Therefore,	   to	   the	   extent	   that	   cross-­‐molecule	   and	   cross-­‐class	   pollution	  cannot	  otherwise	  be	  controlled,	  a	  key	  component	  of	  antibiotics	  in	  the	  aHIF	  would	  be	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an	   international	   agreement	   not	   to	   permit	   other	   firms	   to	   sell	   aHIF-­‐rewarded	  antibiotics,	  regardless	  of	  the	  patent	  status.	  	  Put	  another	  way,	  pollution	  externalities	  might	  require	  all	  antibiotics	  to	  be	  in	  the	  aHIF.	  	  	  Some	   have	   suggested	   longer	   patents	   for	   antibiotics.61	  	   Without	   the	   aHIF,	  simply	  extending	  exclusivity	  rights	  is	  a	  non-­‐starter,	  since	  it	  opens	  up	  opportunities	  for	  exploitation	  of	  consumers	  by	  innovators	  without	  any	  clear	  conservation	  gains.62	  Within	   the	   aHIF	   mechanism,	   extending	   exclusivity	   rights	   is	   consistent	   with	  maintaining	   roughly	   the	   same	   level	   of	   profits	   while	   improving	   clinical	   and	  conservation	  outcomes.	  	  James	   Love	   has	   criticized	   the	  HIF	   for	   not	   relying	   on	   generic	   production	   to	  ensure	   the	   lowest	   possible	  marginal	   cost	   of	   production.63	  As	   discussed	   above,	  we	  find	   these	   concerns	   to	   be	   addressed	   by	   the	   companies’	   incentives	   to	   realize	   the	  greatest	  health	  impact	  at	  the	  lowest	  possible	  contractual	  price.	  	  But	  in	  the	  context	  of	  antibiotics,	   this	   criticism	   gains	   even	   less	   traction.	   	   Global	   public	   health	   is	   clearly	  advanced	   by	  wide	   dissemination	   of	   quality	   generic	   statins	   to	   treat	   cardiovascular	  disease;	   the	   same	   cannot	   be	   said	   for	   antibiotics	   with	   resistance	   problems.	   	   We	  suggest	  that	  unconstrained	  generic	  production	  of	  antibiotics	  might	  make	  the	  global	  conservation	  effort	  more	  difficult,	  tipping	  the	  long-­‐term	  ecological	  and	  evolutionary	  balance	  in	  the	  wrong	  direction.	  	  Further	  research	  is	  clearly	  needed	  on	  this	  question.	  	  
Finally,	   the	  patent	  holder	  may	  hesitate	   to	   transfer	   the	  patent	   in	  advance	  of	  the	  10-­‐year	  HIF	  reward	  payments.	   	  The	  HIF	  will	  gain	  credibility	  as	  a	  counterparty	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  61	  Eric	  Kades,	  Preserving	  a	  Precious	  Resource:	  Rationalizing	  the	  Use	  of	  Antibiotics,	  99	  NW.	  UNIV.	  L.	  REV.	  611	  (2005);	  Infectious	  Diseases	  Society	  of	  America,	  supra	  note	  1.	  
62 Vanishing	  Public	  Domain,	  supra	  note	  28. 63	  See	  Love,	  supra	  note	  22.	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over	   time,	   so	   perhaps	   this	   issue	   will	   diminish	   in	   importance	   in	   future	   years.	  	  Antibiotics	  do	  not	  appear	  to	  present	  novel	  questions	  for	  this	  specific	  issue.	  	  
V.	  	   Conclusion	  	  	   The	   antibiotic	   sector	   is	   an	   attractive	   but	   complex	   candidate	   for	   testing	   the	  Health	  Impact	  Fund.	   	  Poor	  market	   incentives	  have	  led	  both	  industry	  and	  academic	  researchers	   to	   suggest	   de-­‐linkage	   mechanisms	   as	   a	   means	   to	   simultaneously	  address	   problems	   with	   conservation	   and	   R&D.	   	   The	   looming	   crisis	   of	   antibiotic	  resistance	  is	  an	  important	  global	  problem.	  	  Resistant	  diseases	  are	  significant	  health	  risks	   throughout	   the	   world.	   	   This	   problem	   threatens	   both	   high-­‐	   and	   low-­‐income	  populations,	   and	   it	   may	   prove	   impossible	   to	   solve	   without	   an	   effective	   global	  coordination	  mechanism.	  	  The	  aHIF	  demonstration,	  while	  modestly	  sized	  compared	  to	  global	  pharmaceutical	  markets,	  is	  probably	  large	  enough	  to	  alter	  incentives	  in	  the	  antibiotic	  sector.	  	  	  Some	  of	  the	  criticisms	  raised	  about	  the	  HIF	  apply	  with	  less	  force	  in	  the	  antibiotic	  sector,	  making	  it	  an	  attractive	  candidate	  for	  a	  full-­‐scale	  test.	  	  	   The	  aHIF	  is	  not	  without	  significant	  challenges.	  	  Financing	  must	  be	  robust	  and	  sustainable.	   	  Adequate	  and	   realistic	   resistance	   targets	  will	  have	   to	  be	   set	   globally,	  without	  political	  meddling.	  	  Achieving	  these	  targets	  will	  be	  partially	  delegated	  to	  the	  companies,	  but	  they	  will	  also	  be	  accountable	  to	  the	  aHIF	  for	  failing	  to	  hit	  the	  mark.	  	  Drug	  companies	  will	  therefore	  be	  encouraged	  to	  cooperate	  for	  global	  public	  health	  in	  unprecedented	  ways,	  with	  equally	  impressive	  impacts	  on	  global	  health.	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   The	   aHIF	   can	   serve	   a	   key	   role	   as	   a	   global	   coordination	   mechanism	   for	  antibiotics,	   ensuring	   that	   this	   important	   drug	   class	   does	   not	   fade	   away,	   but	  continues	  to	  serve	  humanity.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
